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Abstract 
 This paper looks into ROSCAs as funding source for the poor. The evidence from the ROSCAs in Pakistan 
(Dera Ghazi Khan) suggests that regular incomes are essential for the smooth functioning of ROSCAs therefore 
ROSCA is popular among salaried classes. Poor people usually have insufficient and irregular incomes due to 
which they are considered trouble makers and therefore are excluded from the ROSCAs. In conclusion ROSCAs 
cannot provide funding for the poor people and thus cannot substitute microfinance.  
Key Words: ROSCAs, poverty alleviation, finance, developing countries, Pakistan 
 
Introduction 
Credit is essential particularly for poor (Rutherford, Colllins and Johnson, 2013) as they cannot save big amounts 
on their own to initiate business or finance their working capital or to invest in fixed assets and so they need 
access to credit. Credit can help to smooth consumption particularly for those who face seasonal fluctuations in 
business. In addition to this, credit facilitates to meet sudden needs such as accidents or unusual events such as 
illness or may be marriage. Indeed, availability of the credit can increase ability of poor to absorb such shocks 
and to increase income by investing it into business.   
 
However, poverty has several consequences one of which is financial exclusion. Poor are considered risky 
clients by the conventional banks because of many reasons for instance, they neither have financial collateral to 
offer to bank as security nor credit history or certain income sources. Even local money lenders extend loans to 
those who can offer physical collateral as security. Due to these, they have not been getting access to the funds in 
order to meet their financial needs until introduction of microfinance. Microfinance is designed to extend 
financial services to poor or low income people. Although there is little information in literature on the clients of 
microfinance but a look at success stories posted on the websites of microfinance banks clears that microfinance 
target market is composed of poor and small entrepreneurs engaged in household businesses such as handmade 
products, small shack stores, tailoring, etc ( e.g. Website of Khushhali bank).  
A large number of research papers suggest that microfinance has positive impact on wellbeing of the poor 
(Mosley, 2001; Pitt et al., 2003;; Khandker, 2005;  Chowdhury, Ghosh and Wright, 2005; ) and helped them to 
generate revenue and increase income when they invest it wisely into their business (Mosely and Hulme, 1998; 
Abbasi, Sarwar and Hussain, 2005) but in the last few years, microfinance has come under great criticism due to 
commercialisation and higher interest rates (Karnani, 2007; Bateman, 2010) particularly the initial public 
offering by compartamos in the year 2007 has worsened the situation.   
The bank compartamos was established as an NGO. During the Maxican crises in 1995, organisation charged 
high interest rates to generate profits enough to attract private capital and then it transformed into for profit 
organisation in 2000. In the year 2007, it earned huge profit through initial public offering. Charging high 
interest rates deemed essential by the commercialised MFIs to attract private funding from capital market. It may 
be necessary for the MFIs to charge high interest rates but also raises concerns for the poor who may not come 
out of poverty as big portion of their income may go into the interest payments. The need for capital and 
negative effects of high interest rates has led development agencies to look for substitutes such as credit unions, 
ROSCAs etc.  
Anthropological literature on ROSCAs suggests that ROSCAs are mostly used by low income class. For instance 
Ardener (1995, p.2), states that “where incomes are very low, where there is no formal social security network, 
where ill health stalks and a variety of calamities hover, a system of low-cost  ROSCAs helps to meet the 
challenges for all …” . Kurtz (1973) reports positive relation between poverty and ROSCAs’ participation. 
Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) found existence of ROSCAs among poor people. These findings suggest that 
ROSCAs can be used as alternative funding source by the poor people and this paper aims to find out if 
ROSCAs can be used as substitute to microfinance.  
This is a qualitative study and based on the data collected in year 2009 in Dera Ghazi Khan that is located in the 
southern Punjab of Pakistan. During the fieldwork of six months (May, 2009 - Oct, 2009), data was collected 
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through participant observation and semi structured interviews. In order to locate ROSCAs participants, snow 
ball method was used. There were 45 interviews each lasting on average 45 minutes, conducted from the 
participants of ROSCAs.  In order to ensure accuracy, all interviews were tape recorded. The interviews were 
first transcribed in native language in order to carry preliminary analysis and then translated into English.   
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
ROSCAs are informal and indigenous finance system (Besley and Levenson, 1996). It can be found in almost all 
parts of world (Ardener and Burman, 1995) and known with local names for instance Tontine in Cameroon, Hui 
in Taiwan, Tanda in Mexico, Polla in Chile (Armendariz & Morduch, 2005).  A typical ROSCA is a group of 
individuals who decided to contribute a fixed amount each month and by the end of the month, the collected 
amount is given to one member who is selected through some predetermined criteria. Next month, another 
member gets the amount and so on. The receiver of the pot continues to contribute after receiving his pot and this 
process repeat until all members receive their lump sum once. Hence after that group of ROSCA is either 
disbanded or new cycle is started, may be with different members and different durations.  
Literature on ROSCAs provided different rationale for ROSCAs’ participation. Besley Coate and Loury (1993) 
in their paper make assumption that objective of participation is to finance purchase of indivisible durable goods 
particularly in the places where formal finance is underdeveloped and this is later proved by Handa and Kirton 
(1999) in their study on Jamaican ROSCAs. They found that 71% of the ROSCA members use their money to 
acquire durable goods. Srinivasan (1995) studied ROSCA in oxford and reported that people participate in 
ROSCAs to pay for children’s fees, daughter’s dowry, funeral ceremonies etc. Some research studies suggested 
that ROSCAs are used as insurance instruments in less developed areas (Calomiris and Rajarman, 1998; 
Klonner, 2003).   
Individuals are credit constrained and ROSCAs can provide funds to those without access to credit market. 
Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) investigated impact of ROSCAs on the wellbeing of people and reported 
positive impact without having access to formal finance markets. Another study found that participants of 
ROSCAs have more durable assets as compared to non participants (Besley and Levenson, 1996). Such findings 
support the contention that ROSCAs can improve wellbeing of the people. 
Analysis and Discussion 
ROSCAs can be successful only if people continue to pay after receiving their lots. There is no legal and written 
contract that may force participants to make their payments (Khan, 2012). It implies that ROSCAs are very risky 
however there is reported rare/no default in ROSCAs. There can be many reasons for rare default for instance 
social sanctions (Khan, 2012), careful selection of the ROSCAs members, etc that may reduce the default.  This 
paper will look at the selection criteria of ROSCAs to determine who the people excluded from the ROSCAs. 
During the analysis of interviews, it is found that ROSCAs members are evaluated and selected carefully in 
order to avoid future troubles. Thus, a person may not be given membership even he is a close friend or poor 
relative if he is considered unsuitable for the ROSCA particularly by the president of the ROSCA. President is 
the one who organise the ROSCA, receives the first pot of money and is responsible to collect payments from 
the members and to draw lots (Srinivasan, 1995; Brink and Chavas, 1997). It is also important for the successful 
completion of cycle of a ROSCA.  
The selection criteria and selection process is not formally recorded anywhere, but it can be deduced from the 
spoken texts of the interviewees. The analysis of these spoken texts helps to provide an understanding of how the 
selection criteria can lead to the exclusion of certain individuals/groups. It is found that there are certain 
characteristics that make a particular person a suitable/desirable member for the ROSCA. Thus, some people are 
welcomed and given easy access to ROSCAs while some are considered risky and therefore, do not given 
membership. In the following, interviewees’ excerpts will be analysed to investigate who these unsuitable and 
undesirable candidates are?  
Before discussing the interview excerpt, I would like to share my research findings on who are interviewees? 
ROSCAs is popular among salaried and housewives. I also found many ROSCAs running in the bazaar of Dera 
Ghazi Khan (For more discussion Khan, 2012).  These people like to make group with other salaried people for 
instance take example of following excerpt.  
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1 Interviewer: What type of people pay promptly? 
2 Interviewee: People who have regular income. 
3 Salaried people get their salary on 2nd or 3rd of the month. 
4 They pay their committee on time. Daily wage earners 
5 are trouble makers. We do not include them. The purpose 
6 of the committee is to help people meet their need, if it is 
7 not available in time then there is no benefit of it. 
                                                                     (RosUrban-F29) 
 
The woman in the above quote (RQ-29.1) is a sempstress and her husband is an employee of 14 grades in 
WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority). She along with her sister run this ROSCA. The 
interviewee tells that daily wage earners cannot make timely payments and therefore are not good members. She 
does not give membership to such people in her ROSCA. In the quote, she labels daily wage earners as trouble 
makers which according to her, refers to those who make late payments. There are excerpts below in which 
interviewee has same opinion about the daily wage earners as the previous interviewee (RQ-29.1).   
 
 RQ-30.1 
1 It is better not to include  daily wage earners as, if  
2 you include them, they will not pay on time and you will  
3 be in trouble. 
                                                                        (RosUrban-F30) 
 
 RQ-34.1 
1 Daily wage earners create trouble for everybody. I have to  
2 make several visits. I have to answer to other members of the 
3 committee as well.  
                                                                          (RosUrban-F34) 
 
There are others excerpts supporting the idea that small businessmen and daily wage earners are associated with 
late payments and late payers. “I do not include her. She always remained in financial trouble.........her husband 
is street vendors” (RosUrban-F45), “we include only salaried people” (RosUrban-M20). Indeed, analysis of the 
interviews found a consistent frame developing in which daily wage earners are not considered to be suitable 
members for the ROSCAs mainly due to their uncertain and unpredictable income. This ultimately leads to the 
exclusion of such groups from the ROSCAs.  
In order to understand why daily wage earners are not welcomed in ROSCAs, it is important to study this 
category in more detail. Wyman (2007) carried a study to explore income sources of people who live below $2 a 
day and reported only 500 million get their income through salaried jobs or microenterprises while rest of the 
people are wage earners or engaged in small scale businesses activities such as fishing, pastoral activities etc. 
Other income generation activities of the poor may be garbage collecting, making and selling pickle (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2007). Daily wage earners or the street vendors are most vulnerable and susceptible to seasonal 
fluctuations. They may not earn income for days in unfavourable weathers. Thus, poor not only have low but 
irregular income that results in inability to make timely payments. Due to this they are not given access to 
ROSCAs funds which is in one way, very important for the survival of ROSCAs.  
The survival of a ROSCA depends on the payments made by the members. When members cannot make 
payments on time, the receiver of the pot will either get half pot or may get his pot late which makes ROSCAs 
ineffective because the received pot may not be sufficient to meet the need of the poor whether the member need 
it to purchase indivisible durable item or  to pay for children’s fees. It become even more important when 
members of the ROSCAs are micro-entrepreneurs as their business will suffer due to late payment.  
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Poor people usually have low and unpredictable incomes due to which they need credit to smooth consumption 
which is provided by microfinance. The criticism of microfinance has forced to seek alternatives one of which is 
ROSCAs. The analysis of the interviews of ROSCAs participants suggested that ROSCAs do not favour poor 
people with low particularly irregular income due to which they cannot pay regular payments that is crucial for 
the successful completion of the ROSCA cycle. In addition to this, ROSCAs become ineffective if they cannot 
serve people needs. This leads to the conclusion that ROSCAs cannot provide funds to the poor and hence 
cannot substitute microfinance.  
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